Abstract. Security policies are becoming more sophisticated. Operational forces will often be faced with making tricky risk decisions and policies must be flexible enough to allow appropriate actions to be facilitated. Access requests are no longer simple subject access object matters. There is often a great deal of context to be taken into account. Most security work is couched in terms of risk management, but the benefits of actions will need to be taken into account too. In some cases it may not be clear what the policy should be. People are often better at dealing with specific examples than producing general rules. In this paper we investigate the use of Grammatical Evolution (GE) to attempt to infer Fuzzy MLS policy from decision examples. This approach couches policy inference as a search for a policy that is most consistent with the supplied examples set. The results show this approach is promising.
Introduction
In computer systems, a security policy is essentially a set of rules specifying the way to secure a system for the present and the future. Forming a security policy is a challenging task: the system may be inherently complex with many potentially conflicting factors. Traditionally security policies have had a strong tendency to encode a static view of risk and how it should be managed (most typically in a pessimistic or conservative way) [1] . Such an approach will not suffice for many dynamic systems which operate in highly uncertain, inherently risky environments. In many military operations, for example, we cannot expect to predict all possible situations.
Much security work is couched in terms of risk but in the real world there are benefits to be had. In military operations you may be prepared to risk a
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compromise of confidentiality if not doing so could cost lives. There is a need for operational flexibility in decision making, yet we cannot allow recklessness. Decisions need to be defensible and so must be made on some principled basis. People are typically better at making specific decisions than in providing abstract justification for their decisions. It is very useful to be able to codify in what a "principled basis" consists since this serves to document "good practice" and facilitates its propagation.
The above discussion has been couched in terms of human decision making. In some environments the required speed of system response may force an automated decision. Such automated decisions must also be made on a "principled basis", and some of these decisions may be very tricky. Automated support must be provided with decision strategies or rules to apply.
In this paper we investigate how security policy rules can be extracted automatically from examples of decisions made in specified circumstances. This is an exercise in policy inference. The automation aspect of the inference is doubly useful: automated inference techniques can discover rules that humans would miss; and policies can be dynamically inferred as new examples of tricky decisions become available. Thus the current policy can evolve to reflect the experience of the system. For example, if a human determines what the proper response should be based upon the information available, either in real-time or post facto, a conclusion is drawn that similar responses should be given under similar circumstances. Essentially, we attempt to partition the decision space; each partition is associated with a response that is commensurate with the risk vs. benefit trade-off.
In practice, decision makers may come to different decisions in the same circumstances, particularly if the decisions are tricky. Decision makers may use data that is not available to the inference engine to reach a decision, or else decision makers may simply have different appetites for risk. Any inference technique must be able to handle decision examples that do not seem to be entirely consistent. The chosen inference approach here is Grammatical Evolution (GE).
The organisation of this paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the related work. Section 3 introduces Grammatical Evolution. Section 4 presents the Fuzzy MLS policy model, which serves as the learning target throughout the paper. Sections 5 and 6 present the experimental setup and results. Finally Section 7 concludes the paper and suggests possible future work.
Related Work
The application of machine learning techniques on security domain has been focused on intrusion and anomaly detections. Machine learning techniques are used to discover useful patterns of system features that describe the system behaviour. Then, these features are used to recognise anomalies and intrusions. For detail, refer [2] . However, there are limited known attempts in generating the policy automatically from previous decision examples using machine learning techniques. In [3] autonomic security policies were mentioned yet no results have appeared. The only published works are found in [4] in which Genetic Programming is used to infer various Fuzzy MLS policy model from decision examples. The results show GP based approach is promising.
On the other hand, rule inferencing techniques have been around for many years in machine learning domain. Emphasis in this paper is placed on Grammatical Evolution (GE). GE has emerged in recent years as a promising technique. A list of applications and other GE papers can be found at http://www. grammatical-evolution.org/pubs.html. In [5, 6] GE is used to learn investment strategy (trading rules) using the market stock indices. The results show the investment strategy inferred yields profitable performance for the trading periods analysed. In [7] GE is used to evolve rules for foreign exchanges. The rules learnt outperforms the benchmark buy and hold strategy over all the trading periods analysed. However, there have been no previous known research on GE in our domain of interest -security policy.
Grammatical Evolution
Grammatical Evolution (GE) is an evolutionary approach to automated programming. In GE, individuals are variable length binary strings. These individuals serve as indices that map a set Backus Naur Form (BNF) language grammar to programs. These programs can then be executed for fitness evaluation purposes. To solve a problem using GE, the language grammar must first be specified. In BNF, the grammar of a language is represented as a tuple {N, T, S, P } [8] where N is the non-terminal set, T is the terminal set, S is a special element of N called start symbol which is expanded first. P is the set of production rules (also called derivation rules) that is used to guide the expansion from N to T . For example, the following grammar defines a set of arithmetic expressions over the variables X and Y [8] :
P consists of a set of production rules as follows:
The mapping process between the variable length binary individuals and programs using grammar is known as genotype-phenotype mapping. This process is best illustrated with an example. In each individual (genome), every 8 consecutive bits is viewed as an integer which are more commonly known as codon. Consider an individual with the following codons: [10, 5, 51, 8, 16, 49, 30, 18] The codon value is read to determine the usage of a certain production rule to expand the symbol using a modulus mapping function as follows:
Rule = Codon value % T otal number of production rules
where % is the arithmetic modulus operator. Assuming the grammar used is the arithmetic expression grammar discussed, the start symbol is <expr> and the first codon value is 10. 10 % 3 = 1. The production rule 1 is used; <expr> is replaced by (<expr><op><expr>). Assuming leftmost derivation is used, we expand the left most <expr> after '(' which is a terminal. As the second codon value is 5 and the production rules available is 3. 5 % 3 = 2. The production rule 2 is used; the leftmost <expr> is replaced by <var> resulting (<var><op><expr>). The process continues until a complete program is generated, i.e. when all the non-terminals have been mapped to terminals.
Some problems can arise during the mapping process. Firstly, the codon values may run out before the entire mapping process is complete. To overcome this, individual can be wrapped around to reuse the codon value. Second, the mapping process also can be indefinitely long if the grammar used is recursive. This can be resolved by setting an upper bound on the number of times the production rules expansion that can be performed. One possible way to do this is to set a threshold limit on the number of times an individual can wraparound. If a complete program is not fully generated when this threshold is reached, the individual is assigned the lowest possible fitness value.
The greatest advantage of GE is that it allows artifacts to be evolved in a grammar compliant way and many solution spaces can be defined using grammars. The use of grammar also makes program generation in arbitrary languages possible by only changing the BNF grammar. The search algorithm is also an independent component in the system. This feature allows GE to reap the advantages of any improvement in any evolutionary algorithm.
Fuzzy MLS Model
Fuzzy MLS policy model [9] is an adaptive extension to traditional MLS (multilevel security) Bell-LaPadula policy model [10] . In Bell-LaPadula policy model, every subject and object is assigned a security label ( sensitivity level, categories set ). For a read access, r, the policy can be summarised as follows:
where sl and ol are subject and object sensitivity levels and sc and oc are subject and object category sets. In other words, a subject can access an object iff the subject is trustworthy enough (sl ≥ ol) and has the legitimate "need-to-know" (sc ⊇ oc) to access the object. In terms of risk, the traditional MLS policy can be viewed as a fixed trade-off setting between risk of information disclosure versus the benefit an organisation can gain from it. In Fuzzy MLS model, the quantified estimates of the risk for the unauthorised disclosure of information are computed. Then, these estimates are used to build a risk scale shown in Figure 1 .
The risk scale is divided into multiple bands; each band is associated with a decision. The risk in the bottom band is considered low enough so the decision is simply allow whereas the risk in the top band is considered too high so the decision is deny. Each band between the top and bottom is associated with a decision allow with risk mitigation measures.
Fuzzy MLS model defines risk as the expected value of damage caused by unauthorised disclosure of information:
The value of the damage is estimated from the object's sensitivity level. The probability of unauthorised disclosure is estimated by quantifying two "gaps": one between the subject's and the object's sensitivity levels and the other between the subject's and the object's category sets. For simplicity, this experiment looks only at the sensitivity levels and assumes the categories sets are the same, thus risk becomes a function of subject and object sensitivity levels only. For more detail on risk quantification, see [9] .
A function that maps an estimated risk to a risk band is defined in [4] as follow:
band(risk(sl, ol)) = min( log 10 (risk(sl, ol)) , N − 1)
The band numbers start from 0, N is the number of bands desired on the scale and the function risk(sl, ol) is defined in [9] . The intuition of using base-10 logarithm in (2) is to use a risk band number to represent the order of magnitude of risk. Since each band is associated with a decision, a risk band number computed using (2) represents a possible decision in the policy.
Experiments
A policy can be viewed as a function which maps decision making factors to a decision. In Fuzzy MLS model, this mapping is the composition of the band and risk functions shown in (2) . GE is used in this experiment to search for an equivalence of this composition function using a set of decision examples. Each individual represents a candidate function. The search engine used is steady state genetic algorithm with 1% replacement rate scheme used and the selection is Roulette Wheel Selection. The set of production rules, P used is: <expr> ::= <unary_op>(<expr>)|<bin_op>(<expr>,<expr>)|<sub_expr> <sub_expr> ::= <var>|<const> <unary_op> ::= sin|cos|exp|protectedLog10|ceil|floor|exp|-<bin_op> ::= add|minus|multiply|protectedDiv|min|max <var> ::= sl|ol <const> ::= 0.<digit><digit> <digit> ::= 0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9
The angle brackets distinguish the non-terminal symbols, N from terminal symbol, T . The starting symbols is <expr>.
The primitive operators are wrapped as a function call to prevent any bias being introduced among the operators. All functions work in accordance to the specification defined in the ANSI C standard <math.h> library except the following four: min(x, y), max(x, y), protectedDiv(x, y) and protectedLog10(x). min and max operators return the minimum and maximum values between x and y, protectedDiv(x, y) returns x / y if y = 0 and 1 if y = 0, and protectedLog10(x) returns log 10 (x) if x > 0 and 1 otherwise. Instead of using ephemeral random constant (ERC), the const and digit rules are used to generate random constant in the range of (−1, 1). Generating random constant in this fashion enables random number to partake in the evolutionary process.
Crossover and mutation operations are applied to individual at each iteration with probability of 0.9 and 0.01 respectively. The mutation operator used is the standard bit-level GE mutation which flips each bit of the individual probabilistically. Two experiments have been carried out to investigate two different implementation of crossover operations; one-point crossover and effective crossover. One point crossover first chooses a point randomly on each of the two selected individuals and all data beyond that point are swapped between the two individuals. The chosen crossover point may happen to be after the effective length of the individual (the portion of the individual that are actually used to select the rules) and render the crossover operation effectiveless. Effective crossover restricts the chosen crossover point in the range of effective length.
The initial population size is set to be 1024. Two experiments have been carried out to investigate two population initialisation methods. In the first experiment, each individual is initialised randomly with lengths in the range of [15, 25] . In the second experiment, the sensible initialisation method [11] is used. This initialisation method models the popular ramp half and half initialisation method [12] ; it takes the population size, minimum and maximum heights of the derivative trees permitted in the population as input parameters and generates approximately 50% full derivative trees with maximum height while the 50% have heights between the minimum and the maximum heights. In this experiment, the minimum and maximum heights are set to be 1 and 10.
The fitness evaluation for each individual is evaluated against a set of training examples. Each example x is a tuple of (sl x , ol x , band x ) , where band x is calculated using (2) and therefore all the examples used are correct. The training set consists of all 100 (sl, ol) integer pairs for sl and ol in the range of [0, 9] .
Two experiments have been carried out to investigate two different fitness functions. In the first experiment, the weighted fitness function (3) presented in [13] is used. This allows us to compare the performances of GE and GP side by side. Two principles are used to determine the score for a decision made by an individual. For an example x and an individual i, if i evaluates x to be in band j (j is eval(i, x) rounded to the nearest integer), then:
-For a correct decision, reward more the higher the risk band, -For an incorrect decision, punish more the more the decision deviates from the target. Also, punish under-estimation of the risk band more than overestimation of it, i.e., punish more if band x > j.
Based upon these principles, f itness(i) is defined as follow:
where
The fitness function in the second experiment is inversely proportional to the sum of absolute differences between the value an individual evaluated to with the correct band encoded in the examples:
Result and Discussion
Each experiment described is run 10 times. Two testing sets are used to evaluate the performance of the best individual. The first testing set is same as the first 100-example training set. This testing set provides a good indication on how much "knowledge" has been acquired by the approach employed in a fixed number of generations. The second testing set consists of 100 randomly generated Sum of absolute differences
Number of generations Sum of absolute differences: sensible initialisation, one-point crossover Sum of absolute differences: sensible initialisation, effective crossover Sum of absolute differences: random initialisation, one-point crossver Sum of absolute differences: random initialisation, effective crossver (sl, ol) pairs where sl and ol are real numbers in [0.0, 9.0]. Therefore, most of these examples are unseen yet similar to training examples. This set provides a good measure on how much the acquired knowledge can be applied for unseen cases. The performance in terms of the sum of differences between the bands output by the fittest individual and the correct bands in the 100 examples in the testing set is shown in Figure 2 respectively. The results show that the policies evolved using sum of absolute differences and outperform the ones evolved using weighted fitness function in both cases at all time during evolution. The sum of absolute differences fitness function provides faster learning speed (steeper slope); it only requires ≈ 100 generations to has the population to become stable as opposed to ≈ 250 generations required by the weighted fitness function. However, the uses of effective crossover and sensible initialisation do not provide any significant performance gain. In comparison to the results obtained using Genetic Programming with the same weighted fitness function and similar parameter settings [13] , the performance of GE is superior over GP in terms number of correct bands and mean difference from target band in all cases. The results are summarised in Table 1 . The comparison of results using sum of absolute differences fitness function cannot be done because there is no equivalent experiment carried out in GP.
Lastly, the size of the best individuals are much smaller compared to those in GP. This can be due to the fact that conforming to the grammar correctness in GE is relatively harder than conforming to the type correctness in GP.
Conclusion
We investigated the possibility of using Grammatical Evolution (GE) to infer Fuzzy MLS policy from examples. The results show that this approach is promising. The policies inferred using GE are found to outperform the ones inferred using GP with similar settings [13] . The policies inferred using sum of absolute differences fitness function is found to outperform the ones inferred using weighted fitness function. However, the uses of sensible initialisation and effective crossover in experiment do not provide any significant performance gain.
The availability of a diverse training set currently used in the experiment is difficult to obtain in real-life scenario. Some envisaged work includes: the use of a "less ideal" training set, possibly with the inclusion of wrong examples and skewed distribution on the examples set. One possible solution is to introduce fuzzy set concept. This approach is found to be able to increase the accuracy performance and more resilient to missing examples in the training set [13] .
Inferring security policy with evolutionary algorithm is a very interesting domain. Everyone accepts that policy specification is currently hard, and things are set to worsen as systems are deployed in ever more complex environments with increasing sophistication and subtlety of decision making needed. This work shows GE has very considerable promise. We recommend this important application area to fellow researchers.
